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Abstract 
Enterprises in transition from state to private ownership in the emerging market economies 
of Central and Eastern Europe face massive risks. Here we analyze how they might have 
also the rewards that may, only with the proper management, accompany acceptance of risks. 
In this paper, risks are itemized and quantified for a typical situation from their many 
potential sources: BUSINESS (including accounting and control system, financial, 
operations, marketing, strategic, and management risks), LEGAL, ECONOMIC, 
ENVIRONMENTAL, GOVERNMENTAL SUPPORT, and POLITICAL. Because these 
risks are felt differently by the seller, namely the state, and the buyer, the comparative 
objectives of buyer and seller and associated measures of performance are identified. 
Potential sources of joint gains for both buyer and seller are evaluated, which reduces both 
the risk that the enterprise is not sold, and the chance of subsequent failure of the new firm. 
The effectiveness and practicality of a variety of techniques for risk reduction are analyzed, 
including some innovations in the privatization arrangement. The potential for reducing risk 
will be seen to be far beyond what typically is now in place. The analysis relies on an 
example model that represents a typical privatization situation in a Central or Eastern 
European country. 
Gaining the Rewards From Privatization Risks 
in Central and Eastern Europe 
Samuel E. ~ o d i l ~ '  
In the command economies, people gave up their freedom of choice in exchange 
for security. Now almost all centrally planned economies have moved to freedom of 
choice, and the people have given up the certainties in their lives. Why have they done 
this? Because of the promised rewards of taking risk. And now there is grave danger 
that somewhere down the road the rewards will not have materialized for many people 
and they will ask "We took the risks, now where are the rewards?" 
This grand disillusionment may come as people realize that rewards are not 
guaranteed by risk taking, they are only associated with risk taking. The connection 
between risk and reward in market economies is there due to constant vigilant effort 
towards identifying, valuing, reducing, and controlling risk. The hand described by 
Adam Smith may be invisible, but it is based on considered, assertive, action and is not at 
all the same hand on the controls of the command economy. This paper is intended to 
help those who are transferring enterprises to private hands and those receiving these 
newly privatized firms to manage the risks and enjoy the rewards of their endeavors. 
We focus here on risks to an enterprise at the time of transition from state-control 
to private control, primarily in the context of Central and Eastern Europe. Nonetheless 
the ideas here will be of interest in the privatization that is taking place elsewhere around 
the world. 
There are two significant players in the transition of a state-owned enterprise into 
private hands: the seller, namely the state; and the buyer, which is another firm, an 
individual, or a group of individuals. The interests of buyer and seller diverge in any 
situation, yet there must be some zone of convergence if a privatization transaction is to 
take place. First, we enumerate the potential sources of risk. Since the perspectives of 
buyer and seller differ, we identify the objectives and measures of performance of each. 
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Then we develop a consistent decision model that will project attribute values for buyer 
and seller in a potential privatization transaction given choices that can be made in the 
privatization negotiation. Areas are identified where joint gains can be obtained for buyer 
and seller. 
Risks are then quantified in the model. The analysis of the magnitude of the total 
risk explains why there is often no buyer for a firm, particular when the assessments of 
risk are different for buyer and seller. Ways of reducing risk are then described and 
some methods are applied to the example. Not only does this enhance the possibility of 
the privatization deal being struck; it greatly improves the chances for success of the 
fledgling f m  in uncertain world of the market economy. 
Our analysis relies on a case example that represents a typical privatization 
situation in a Central or Eastern European country. The example is the composite of 
many different real situations. The focus is on the privatization process for a 
multinational company acquiring a major firm by direct sale, however the ideas here are 
relevant to many types of buyers, including individuals or investment funds holding 
vouchers and privatization ministries. It may also be useful to companies that are already 
privatized as stock companies that now are involved in negotiations to recapitalize or 
restructure. The example contains more issues than any single situation and so the 
underlying model is distilled to the essential relationships in order to streamline this 
discussion. 
It would seem that an enterprise becoming private in a newly-made market 
economy faces every conceivable uncertainty. Of course, any f m  faces business risks, 
but the transition from a command economy magnifies even the common risks, and adds 
many others. Management behavior that led to success in the command economy creates 
additional risks in the market economy. 
Exhibit 1 displays the potential uncertainties, with the usual business risks in the 
left column and other risks in the right column. Under the business heading are the usual 
risks along with some that have special meaning in the privatization context. 
There is the potential for accounting error and misunderstanding in many business 
situations. In the transition from command economies this can be particularly serious. 
Basic terms, such as profit and cash flow have been undefined or misunderstood; in many 
cases the measure of performance has been tons of product or size of plant. True fixed 
and variable costs are rarely tracked accurately. This makes income data suspect. And 
there is little to go on for valuing a firm, except book value, which has little meaning, 
especially in a highly inflationary economy. 
Fmancing a firm is much more difficult in the economies in transition. Personal 
savings have been spent on the inflation that followed the freeing of prices, leaving 
meager internal sources of capital. Even healthy firms may have difficulty obtaining 
capital for short-term projects and for working capital. A four year loan is long-term. 
Real rates of interest are high, above 5% and often above 10% when money is offered. 
This means that many firms can expect to meet their capital needs only through retained 
earnings. 
Unfortunately, a good enterprise's earnings may be retained by others. In the 
command economy it was good business practice to extend credit to suppliers and 
customers. It gave a competitive edge in obtaining raw materials and selling products. 
This means, however, that the enterprise is owed a lot of money. The enterprise may 
have a substantial net worth if these arrears are paid and otherwise be insolvent if they 
are not. 
Successful operating of the new company will depend on how productivity and 
quality improves in the newly privatized firm relative to the rise in wages. It is not 
unusual to find as many as three times more employees than are needed to do the work. 
Wages are correspondingly low, but there is a great appetite to bring them up to Western 
standards. The risk is that productivity increases may not keep pace with wage increases. 
This may have much to do with government and union flexibility on reducing the number 
of workers and making wage concessions. 
To many enterprises, the most significant risk would be in marketing. Many 
products in the command economies were sold only because the customer had no choice 
of product. Most of these products will not sell on the global market at any profitable 
price. In the short-term, the product may sell domestically if only because it enjoyed a 
monopoly in the command economy, but without product improvement, this market will 
not last. The marketing task is to upgrade products to global standards quickly using 
available technology, before the local market evaporates. It is by no means certain that 
this can be done, nor that the global market penetration will be sufficient. 
The strategic risk comes from two sources. One is the relationship of the new 
firm to its industry. Both the industry and the new firm will likely undergo restructuring. 
Typically both suffer from too much vertical integration, for example. The successful 
privatized firm will generally sell off some businesses and perhaps take on some others. 
In the meantime the industry will have changed also, maybe at a faster pace. It is unclear 
whether a particular firm will emerge a winner when the dust settles. 
Management behavior is another chancy aspect, whether or not experienced top 
management is brought into the new firm. Some of the management from the command 
economy will by necessity remain. Resources will have been inefficiently deployed under 
these managers in the past; can those resources be effectively redeployed. Will they 
make effective use of scarce capital and grow the firm? Or will they remain in the old 
mindset? 
Activities that led to risk reduction in the command economy may magnify the risk 
in the market economy. There are several aspect to the change from command to market 
that relate to this: 
Supply scarcity becomes money (capital) scarcity. In the command economy it 
was good management to maintain high raw material inventories to assure the 
ability to produce goods. This results in high carrying costs. Also to reduce risk, 
there was a high degree of vertical integration, which is now largely unwarranted, 
and results in inefficient use of management (due to low specialization) and of 
capital (due to the duplication of activities and low scale economies). It was wise 
to extend credit to partners and customers in order to assure continuing production 
and sales of product. Of course it also leads to a circle of debt among businesses 
which makes the survivability of all uncertain. 
Collective responsibility becomes individual responsibility. To some extent in 
the command economy risk could be minimized by avoiding individual 
responsibility, and taking moves collectively. In the market economy, success is 
related to moving quickly and each individual manager must take action. If they 
wait for someone else to initiate improvements or for the group to resolve an issue 
it can be too late. 
Aim to grow size of operation, not its value. In the command economy it would 
seem that success was related to the size of an operation and that a manager could 
reduce risk to his enterprise by making it bigger. This suggests 1) having many 
workers 2) having a large plant and 3) increasing production. Of course, in a 
market economy moving in this direction can increase risk of survival to the firm 
by having 1) low productivity 2) low capacity utilization and 3) unsold product. 
There are even cases in the command economy of exporting product at a price 
below variable cost in order to increase volume of production. The old quip "If 
you produce it at a cost of three, and sell it for two, then you must make it up in 
volume," may fit some situations. 
The non-business risks are particularly pronounced in the new market-economies. 
The legal framework is ill-defined (sometimes almost non-existent). The ability to make 
enforceable contracts, collect debts is uncertain, even what organization (federal, 
provincial, regional, city, district of city) has jurisdictional responsibility. 
Economic risks are significant enough when a company is privatized in a pre- 
existing market economy, for example Great Britain or France. Uncertainty in the 
macro-economy is even more pronounced in an economy that is rising like a Phoenix 
from the ashes of the command economy. The level of inflation will show great 
variability and is often mercurial (e.g. inflation in the Russian Federation in 1992 was 
200096, mid-year figures). In the usual cases, the rate of currency exchange is important 
to the buyer, and very difficult to predict. The growth of the domestic market, which is 
the prime market for the firm's goods and services, is capricious. The infrastructure to 
be used by the firm, roads, communications, and price and availability of energy, are all 
unsure. 
The command economies left a legacy of environmental damage. The extent of 
ground and groundwater pollution on property will usually be fully realized only after 
ownership of the property and a full assessment is made. Even then the costs will be 
uncertain until the cleanup is completed. Uncertainty about the liability of the owners 
will continue sometime after that. 
Many state-owned enterprises will not be privatized, as one might imagine from 
this catalogue of risks, unless the government offers some guarantees or other incentives. 
This may take the form of tax relief from federal or local governments through a tax 
holiday or reduced tax rate, even investment grants for certain technology or, for 
example, pollution control technology. It might also take the form of short-term 
protection from foreign competitive products through a tariff duty on imports. Of course 
many of these arrangements are settled in advance of a privatization and not totally 
uncertain once an agreement is in place. Ahead of time, however, they may be uncertain 
as to their magnitude and duration, and even when put in place, the ability to maintain the 
agreements with subsequent governments may be in question. 
The final category on our list of risks is political, last but not least. There is 
some concern that a firm might be renationalized with only partial compensation. Or that 
the change of regime will limit the prospects for a company. This latter may seem 
unlikely to happen. Consider, however, the example of a Slovakian company with more 
than half of its business in Prague that was newly privatized in 1992. In the next year it 
is no longer operating under Czechoslovakian laws, and in fact is a foreign company in 
the Czech Republic, and therefore subject to different rules. 
Even with such a long list, there must be items of risk that are missing. Of 
course, it will be difficult to consider even a portion of this list explicitly in our case 
example. The list does, however, indicate the kinds of risks and the large number of 
risks in privatization. 
Adding to the problem of risk and differences in the way that risk impacts buyer 
and seller in a privatization is the fact that buyers and sellers have different objectives for 
a privatization. Exhibit 2 shows some of the objectives of the two sides to the 
transaction, along with some possible associated measures of performance for the new 
firm. 
The buyer has a strong interest in potential cash flow from the firm to be acquired 
and also in its strategic importance to other businesses operated by the buyer. The buyer 
may, for example, wish to limit the erosion of sales of existing products and avoid the 
movement of manufacturing away from existing facilities, which would reduce capacity 
utilization. 
In addition to revenue to be raised by the sale, the seller may be interested in high 
future employment levels, imports, local content of goods, new investment in the 
domestic economy, tax revenue, and protection of the environment. They may also be 
interested in the domestic availability of high-quality products or how well the new firm 
carries out the country's industrial policy. 
The privatization process is different from other merger and acquisition activity. 
In privatization the seller, a government, cares greatly about what happens to the 
properties after they are sold, not simply how much value they may get from it. This is 
even more true in economies that are in transition to the market. Not only will the new 
economy rise or fall with the performance of the newly privatized firms, but political 
goals important to the survival of the government depend on achieving the objectives 
including those in Exhibit 2. 
At first glance, it would seem that the differing objectives of buyer and seller will 
lead to conflict, making it harder to carry out a privatization transaction and then to have 
the subsequent support of the government. However, by structuring the deal 
appropriately, it may in fact provide opportunities to get away from zero-sum competitive 
situations and to find joint gains. Without finding ways to reduce these risks, however, 
the seller may face what may even be a larger risk--to propose privatization for an entity 
and then fail to go through with it. 
4. CASE EXAMPLE AND MODEL 
An illustrative example would be very helpful to the study of how buyer and seller 
can improve the rewards of privatization. And to accompany the example, a decision 
model would provide the necessary linkage between decisions taken by each party and the 
benefits they derive. Such a model would be imperative for placing an ownership value 
on the enterprise, particularly since there was no such number before. The model is 
essential also to estimating the benefits to the government and consequently to measure 
the success of the privatization process itself. 
The model should be consistent with discounted cash flow @CF) concepts of 
modem financial theory. Yet it cannot rely on valuation models which draw heavily on 
the evaluation of active stock and bond markets, since these markets are fledgling or non- 
existent. The model must captures the idiosyncratic characteristics of an enterprise, the 
country in which it exists, and the macroeconomy. Thus a model would be needed for 
each separate instance. Yet many of the characteristics will be similar across many cases. 
Of course, we wish to go beyond specific recommendations for a unique case, here, to 
abstract some techniques and principles that will be helpful in many settings. A 
composite case situation, bringing together aspects of many real situations, seems to be 
the most appropriate abstraction. In order to avoid falling on political landmines, it is 
best to make the country a composite also. 
Consider the country of Ceerovia (CEErovia), so named because it reflects many 
of the common characteristics of economic history of Central or Eastern Europe (CEE). 
It's concern for privatization is real even though Ceerovia isn't on your map. 
Negotiations are underway between the privatization ministry of Ceerovia and a 
multinational company that is interested in purchasing some or all of a manufacturing 
enterprise which has a range of products now sold exclusively in Ceerovia. A 
multinational buyer is merely illustrative of many possible potential buyers and is not 
necessarily the norm in CEE privatization. Of course multinationals are important 
sources of experienced management and capital and make up a significant percentage of 
successful privatizations, at least when weighted by size. 
The government of Ceerovia has a number of decision variables available to it 
relating to this privatization. It can provide a protective tariff on products entering 
Ceerovia that compete against those of the enterprise. It can guarantee to indemnify the 
company for a particular percentage of environmental damage due to past activities. It 
can determine the length of any tax relief or tax holiday, and set the depreciation period 
for computing the tax deduction from capital investments. It can choose to retain a 
certain ownership in the enterprise, and it could choose to provide a loan for a chosen 
percentage of the capital investment in the new company. 
The buyer, on the other hand has some flexibility about how the new company 
will be run. They can choose the what percentage of the products in Ceerovia are 
produced locally rather than imported as components. They can determine the amount of 
investment in a greenfield plant in Ceerovia. And of course, buyer and seller, together 
negotiate the price for the enterprise. All of these decisions will have an effect on the 
Net Present Value (NPV) of the cash flows for the firm and other measures of 
performance. Other business and macroeconomic variables will also affect these 
performance measures. 
Business variables include such things as the size of the domestic (inside Ceerovia) 
and global markets (outside Ceerovia) for the manufactured goods of the new company 
and their rates of growth; variable and fixed costs; and the rate of wage increases less 
productivity increases. Macroeconomic variables include interest rates and currency 
exchange rates, among others. The currency used in Ceerovia is the CEE, abbreviated 
C, which at the moment trades at a 1 to 1 rate with that of the currency used by the 
buying firm. 
The basic relationships among the variables in our illustrative model for Ceerovia 
are described by the influence diagram of Exhibit 3. In the diagram, rectangles indicate 
choices taken either by the government (seller) or the buyer. The nodes with the rounded 
corners are measures of performance that influence the value to buyer or seller or both. 
The other nodes (ovals) are intermediate variables representing various cost or financial 
numbers that link decision variables to measures of performance. An arrow running from 
one variable to another suggests the direction of influence. For example, the Tax Relief 
decision variable affects the Taxes that are collected. Some of these ovals have no 
arrows corning into them, and thus are unaffected by decisions; they represent exogenous 
influences such as those from the macroeconomy or the industrial environment. 
The specific influences of one variable on another can be written in a spreadsheet 
model. Exhibit 4 shows the solution to such a spreadsheet model, using the buyer's base 
(firstcut) assumptions. We assume that the seller's analysis would use the same model 
with a different assumption set, that is, different values for the variables in the upper 
portion of the spreadsheet. 
The calculation of the government value in the model is given by 
Govt Value = NPV*Govt Ownership Share + Price + Taxes NPV 
+ .3*(Export-Import) + 1.1 *TaxesonLocalWages + . 1 *Greenfield Investment. 
This reflects the value from any government ownership retained, the income from the 
sale, and the discounted present value of the taxes collected. It also accounts for the 
degree to which exports exceed imports, the amount of local wages the new firm 
produces, and the amount of greenfield investment, although an econometric analysis 
might be necessary to scientifically estimate the correct multipliers to use for these items. 
This approach is again illustrative; there are many other ways to measure government 
value besides the one described here for Ceerovia. 
One of the fundamental risks, and a particularly large one in many CEE countries 
is that no privatization deal can be struck. Consequently the enterprises will rapidly die 
or slowly shrivel under state control. This outcome would have the value (0,O) to buyer 
and seller. So we focus first on improving the chances of consummating a privatization 
arrangement and finding values above zero for both parties. 
The government's (seller's) base assumptions and results are shown in Exhibit 5. 
Note the difference from the buyer's base assumptions in the initial Domestic Market 
(200 Million Cs rather than SO), the Global Market (10 Million Cs rather than 120) and 
the local content (0% rather than 60%). Comparison of the two base cases indicates what 
may often happen in first-cut analyses by two sides of a bargaining situation: each party 
views the transaction as rosy for the other party, but not for themselves--notice the highly 
negative value for themselves. This occurs even though both sides are using the same 
model, just differing assumptions--the effect may be even more pronounced in reality 
where the two sides have differing views of how the variables relate to one another. 
5.1 Jnformation Sharing 
If we stop at these first-cut evaluations, no deal will be struck, since each party 
sees a negative value from the opportunity. There may not even be any further 
discussion. Consider, however, what further discussion, even information sharing may 
do to the transaction. 
The buyer, which is a company that operates globally in the product markets of 
the enterprise being sold, would be in a better position than the government to know 
about the market prospects worldwide. On the other hand, the government, having access 
to inside information from the enterprise as well as information sources within various 
ministries, may be in a better position than the buyer to know the size of the domestic 
market. Thus, if they were to share information, they might convince the other party of 
their assessments of the markets they each know best. For example, consider the results 
if we use the buyer's estimate of the global market and the government's assessment of 
the domestic market. In evaluating it, we would need to set the other input variable about 
which they differ--the local content. Recall the seller had the local content at 0%, 
reflecting their expectation that the buyer will wish to sell the goods in Ceerovia but 
manufacture them elsewhere. The buyer had assumed for political and strategic reasons 
that they would use a high local content, even though it would be more costly. Suppose 
they discuss the local content issue and agree that it would be 60% over the first five 
years of operation. 
Combining these variables we have a result that is much better for each party (and 
now positive for both), as shown in the diagram of Exhibit 6. While the information 
sharing assumptions may be extreme (the parties may not be totally convinced by the 
other party's market assessments), many other compromise assumptions would also give 
better, positive, outcomes to each party than their respective base case assumptions, 
although the improvement would be less dramatic. 
5.2 Negotiating Joint Gains 
Various agreements between buyer and seller can be struck that can potentially 
improve the privatization for both parties. This would not only reduce the risk of no 
privatization, it will reduce the risk of financial failure after the privatization. Some of 
the decision variables available (see the influence diagram) are 
tariff protection- that is a tax on those foreign products that enter the country 
which compete against products made by the new firm 
environmental indemnity- the percentage payment by the government of any 
claims against the new firm due to prior activities of the enterprise 
tax relief- a holiday from taxes for a specified number of years after 
privatization 
government ownership the government may retain some ownership of the 
firm, under 50% if the buyer is to be a strategic investor. 
The effects of changing each of these controls one-at-a-time to given levels are 
shown in Exhibit 7. In general, altering these variables affords opportunities to move to 
the right and up in the space of value for the two parties, and are thus inviting. Unless 
the privatization process includes consideration of some of these opportunities in the 
context of the firm, more risk than is necessary will fall to the firm. 
It is not necessarily the case that all of these controls will be used, however, for 
political, or strategic reasons. For example, the tariff protection is attractive to the firm, 
since it means less competition, which translates either to a higher sales price for a given 
volume of sales or a higher volume of sales. It also provides income to the government 
and gives a higher level of government value. However, the model is not designed to 
consider the effects on a silent party to the transaction, the consumer (and hence the 
economy). These and other political considerations may lead the government to decline 
the tariffs. Yet opportunities to reduce risk and raise value will be lost if those variables 
in the negotiation that are feasible are not explored. 
So far all that has been presented here has assumed that there would be no 
greenfield investment by the new fm (and its new owner), although the model will 
accommodate investment in a greenfield manufacturing site within the range of 0 to 1000 
million Cs. Typically, when multinationals have considered purchasing a CEE enterprise, 
the investment in a greenfield operation, while very desirable for the government, is not 
particularly attractive; gaining access to new markets or acquiring assets is more 
attractive. And without a greenfield investment, the variable cost and quality of 
manufacture within the country may not be attractive, leading the buyer to keep the local 
content low. The government may not wish to privatize the enterprise unless there is new 
investment in manufacturing promised. Thus there is a stalemate, and the deal may not 
take place. 
It is possible, however, through the use of various incentives, for the government 
to entice the buyer to make their desired investment, thereby achieving some other 
desired objectives as well. For example, if the buyer makes the investment, it then 
becomes attractive to the buyer to use much more local content in the goods that they sell 
in the country, which is another objective of the government. Generally several 
incentives must be combined to bring about such an outcome. 
The model was used to evaluate the following package of investment incentives 
and activities: tax relief for the first five years of operation, tariff protection with a 25% 
duty on foreign goods, a government loan of 95% of the greenfield investment, and in 
exchange an agreement by the firm to invest 1000 million Cs in a greenfield plant, and to 
use local content of 98% of the products sold in Ceerovia or exported by the firm to other 
countries. The resultant value to both buyer and seller is very high, as indicated by the 
buyer and seller values for this alternative shown in Exhibit 7, even though doing just one 
item in the package of incentives and promises would not have been attractive to both 
buyer and seller. 
Pushing the idea of joint gains to its extreme, we identified a combination of 
activities that would give the Nash bargaining solution for the Ceerovia model, which is 
also included in Exhibit 7. The items from the model that were allowed to vary were 
Price (of the enterprise to the buyer), amount of Greenfield Investment, Environmental 
Indemnity Percentage, Tax Relief Years, Depreciation Years (period for straight-line 
depreciation), Tariff Percentage, Government ownership, Local Content % , Government 
Loan%, and Tax Rate. In the Nash solution, the product of the buyer and government 
values (above the level for no agreement) is maximized. 
Obviously, the Nash solution is a great improvement over the base solutions of the 
two parties. Because great flexibility was allowed for a great number of variables in 
identifying the solution, it may be somewhat idealistic. For example, it would suggest 
setting the tax rate to zero for the new firm, and establishing a high price for the firm. 
Of course, if tax rate, or some other variable is non-negotiable, the Nash solution could 
be found for the reduced set of decision variables. 
The Nash solution is just one of the desirable Pareto optimal (or non-dominated) 
alternatives (we haven't indicated all of them here), and may not be the solution that the 
two parties are most likely to agree upon. It does demonstrate, however, the dramatic 
joint gains that may be obtained. The primary consideration is to improve upon the status 
quo and achieve as much of the joint gains as possible. 
Uncertainty can be added to the Ceerovia model to reflect the risk assessments of 
the buyer and the seller. Of course their separate assessments may differ. Table 1 shows 
example initial assessments of buyer and seller of some, but not all of the uncertainties. 
Again the buyer is pessimistic about the domestic market relative to the seller, and the 
seller is similarly more pessimistic about the global market. Of course, much more 
uncertainty could have been included (with other uncertain variables or wider input 
distributions), which we will consider later. 
These probability distributions were used to replace the numbers in the appropriate 
cells of the spreadsheet using a spreadsheet add-in called @RISK. This add-in enables 
the simulation of resultant probability distributions for buyer value and government value. 
In effect a large number of scenarios are evaluated where each scenario is based on 
randomly sampling a number for each of the uncertain variables. A graph of the results 
for buyer and seller is shown in Exhibit 8. 
The outcome values in Exhibit 8 are mostly very strongly negative for each side 
with a negative mean and considerable downside risk. Neither side would accept this 
privatization. This pessimism is reminiscent of the certainty base cases in Exhibit 6 
where each side was skeptical about the segment of the market that was less known to 
them. 
Suppose as before we consider the case where buyer and seller share information 
and consolidate their judgments. And suppose each convinces the other party of their 
market assessment in the segment they understand best (global for buyer and domestic for 
seller). Assume that they make an agreement to set the local content to 60%. What 
Table 1 
Base Risk Assessments 
would then result from some reasonable assessments of risk? Example assessments are 
included as the rightmost column of the table above, and the results are shown in Exhibit 
9. Note that Exhibit 9 is based on one set of common risk assessments while Exhibit 8 






Global Market Growth 
WagelProductiv Incr 5% 
Terminal Growth 96 
Environmental Liability 
Multiplier 
The results in Exhibit 9 indicate that the buyer faces a much wider distribution and 
hence more risk than the seller from the same risk assessments. For the seller, the 
outcomes are all positive, but the buyer faces a substantial chance of losing money from 
the purchase. This risk to the buyer would suggest that the sale may be hard to bring 
about, even though the mean outcome may be positive for the buyer. 
The risk is even more significant if one includes more of the potential 
uncertainties. Another case was run where uncertainty was added regarding the future tax 
rate (triangular(.2,.45,.7), the interest rate (normal(.06,.02)), and revenue was lost due to 
non-payment of accounts receivable (the percentage paid was triangular(. 8,. 82,l)). This 
case was run assuming the same package of investment incentives were negotiated as used 
in section 5 above. The probability distributions for buyer and seller are shown in 
Exhibit 10. While the mean outcome for the two parties is significantly positive, the risk 
to the buyer would make the opportunity unacceptable to nearly all potential acquirers. 
The question then becomes how to reduce the risk so that the transaction would be 
acceptable to both parties, and they could then realize the rewards that are possible as 
indicated by the highly positive average outcome. 
Key: a normal distribution is indicated by normal(mean, standard deviation) 
a triangular distribution is indicated by triangular(low,most probable,high) 
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Consider now the possible methods of reducing risk. The aim here is to narrow 
the probability distribution for buyer and seller so that the risk can be acceptable, and in 
this example the concern is greater to reduce the risk to the buyer. This will enable 
"good" deals to happen, and will also make it more likely that the firm will succeed in its 
new form. The effort is not to make "bad" deals acceptable. For example, if the means 
of both buyer value and government value were negative after the best agreement is 
negotiated, there is no point in narrowing the risk, the deal should be abandoned. In this 
example, however there are rewards to be gained, if somehow the risk can be reduced. 
Some of the methods available to reduce risk are shown in Exhibit 11. The list 
begins with some ideas that would be appropriate in many business contexts. The first is 
to conduct market research which would reduce uncertainty about both the size of each 
segment and their growth rates. Marketing contracts set in place prior to the 
privatization would of course replace uncertainty with certainty. It would be even better 
if the contracts were for government purchases as a way of paying down the loan 
provided by the government; this would reduce the government financial risk at the same 
time. 
Where there is substantial legal risk, government clarification of contracts or the 
ability to enforce debts can reduce these risks considerably. Government assurances of 
tax rates and stable interest rates will limit the variation of cash flow. Lines of credit 
guaranteed by the government can serve to carry the firm through short-term cash 
crunches. 
Both the government and the buyer risk may be reduced by debt for equity swaps. 
For example, suppose the Ceerovian government owes money to banks in the country of 
registry of the buyer. These banks may be willing to convert some of that debt for shares 
in the new firm--perhaps to get their money sooner or to move from no return on 
investment to a situation with some potential for appreciation. Similarly, if debts are hard 
to collect, this risk and the risk of high financial leverage may be reduced by having 
some financing provided by a customer, secured by inventories of finished goods or raw 
materials. 
When the buyer faces risk that is simply beyond acceptability, there are many 
innovations to the privatization arrangement that may serve both sides. One is to sell not 
the company but an option on the company, which can be exercised by the buyer either at 
a fixed time in the future--say--three years, or when fixed conditions are met, for 
example-- a profitable year. The buyer could be expected to pay some smaller amount 
for the option, thus giving the seller some immediate value and to pay another amount 
when they exercise the option. This arrangement gives the buyer great incentive to 
perform in the short term. Of course, if they are not successful and the company does 
not become valuable they have nothing to show for their efforts. On the other hand their 
downside cost is low since they can walk away from a bad situation with no further costly 
obligation. This arrangement may also be useful in situations where there is concern that 
the buyer will strip the firm of assets and resources and then abandon it; they don't own 
the firm until it is viable and probably worth more as a going concern than its liquidation 
value. 
If the buyer is interested in the assets of the firm, but not ready to pay a 
satisfactory price for the firm now, it may be beneficial to make a lease-&buy 
arrangement. The government gets immediate placement and revenue. The buyer gains 
some experience operating the assets before making the final decision. 
Many multinational buyers are more interested in access to domestic markets than 
in the enterprise. While the government of Ceerovia would prefer to entice domestic 
manufacturing, they may find it preferable to sell access to their markets rather than 
nothing. By liquidating the enterprise at the same time its markets are transferred, the 
total benefit to the government may be greater. Alternatively, the government may agree 
to give access to domestic markets for an agreement by the buyer to make a greenfield 
investment. 
In some cases restructuring of enterprises may be necessary before the risk is 
acceptable to the buyer. The buyer may find that the entire enterprise has little strategic 
focus and is too vertically integrated. A facility swap with another multinational or 
another enterprise being privatized may be mutually advantageous. 
The probability distributions we have seen for buyer value have displayed much 
more risk than those for the government. This imbalance can be redressed by 
transfemng buyer risk to the government. This may be done by giving the government a 
larger share of ownership. In exchange, the government may indemnify the buyer against 
environmental damage related to past activities. Or it may be in the government's 
interest to provide some capital earmarked for greenfield projects. 
Private ownership of a f m  is important for several reasons. It provides strategic 
control (more than 50% of the voting rights on the board), which is necessary to direct 
any restructuring of the firm. Operating control is needed to redeploy resources and for 
hiring and firing of managers. It is important that the buyer have these kinds of control 
in order to achieve the fundamental aims of privatization (if it weren't important, why 
privatize?). If these kinds of control are assured for the buyer, the sharing of financial 
risk and reward may be divided somewhat differently, to the benefit of both parties. 
Flexible thinking about the sharing of control and risk will open up opportunities for joint 
gains. 
To illustrate some of these risk-reducing ideas, the assumptions used to produce 
the high-uncertainty case in Exhibit 10 were revised to reflect some changes by 
government to improve the conditions for success: clarifications and assurances of the tax 
rate, fixing the interest rate on a government loan, a contract to purchase a fixed amount 
of product of the new firm, and government sharing of environmental risk. The resulting 
probability distributions for buyer and government are shown in Exhibit 12. At this point 
the buyer will likely find the arrangement attractive, and the government value is also 
positive and with low risk. 
Our illustrative examples have only scratched the surface of quantifying the 
possibilities for joint gains and for risk reduction in privatization. The opportunities to be 
exploited are substantial and go beyond what has typically been used in practice. Now 
that many of the easier privatizations have been done, these ideas may be what is needed 
to move through the more difficult situations. There is significant incentive to entice 
privatization ministries and buyers to model the situation and quantify the risks in order to 
make possible more creative paths to their ultimate aims. 
Exhibit 1 
Potential Uncertainties in the Privatization Process in a New Market Economy 
BUSINESS 
accounting and control system 
definitions of tenns 
data accuracy 
appropriate usage of information 
financial 
capital availability-shortAong term 
interest fates 
cost of capital 
debts- payable and receivable 
operations 






global competitiveness of products 
market size/share/growth 
domestic demand for products 
market size/share/growth 
technological improvement in products 
strategic 
industry stnrcture/cornpany restructuring 
erosion of buyer firm sales by new firm 
buyer firm performance 
buyer firm capacity utilization 
management 
redeployment of resources 
effective use of scarce capital 
grow value of firm 
individuals take responsibility 
LEGAL 
operative legal framework 
property rights 
enforcement of contracts 




growth of GDP & market for products 










parantees from government 
tax relief 
investment grants 
protection from entrance of competitors 
tariff protection from competitive imports 
POLITICAL 
currency repatriation possibilities 
renationalization of firm 
change of regime 
Exhibit 2 
Objectives and Performance Measures for Buyer and Seller 
BUYER 
. . iecbves 
develop a new market 
Measures of Performance 
market size 
market growth 
maximize value of new firm NPV of cash flows 
maintain value of existing activities capacity utilization existing company 
erosion of existing sales 
SELLER 
Objectives Measures of Performance 
low unemployment number of jobs, local wages 
increase exports, decrease imports exports - imports 
increase local content of goods produced % local content 
increase investment in local economy funds invested 
increase corporate tax revenue taxes collected 
speed-up tax payment depreciation period for capital 
investment 
create wealth with government share of firm NPV of new firm*Govt Share 
protect environment groundlwaterlair pollution measures 
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30 Local Content % 80.00%Tax Rate 45.00% 
0 Govt Loan% O.OO%IntRate 6.00% 
80.00%Domeo Mkt Gr 5.00%HurdleRat 9.00% 
0 Global Mkt Gr 2.00%GovtHurdR 7.00% 
20 Wage/ProductivIncr% 5.00%TerminGrw 2.00% 
O.OO%YreToRenationalizat 50 XchngRate 1 
0.00% MILLION CEEROVIAN Co 
0 1 2 3 4 5 
50.00 52.50 55.13 57.88 60.78 63.81 
120.00 122.40 124.85 127.34 129.89 132.49 
55.00% 56.10% 58.41% 60.84% 63.38% 66.06% 
70.00 73.50 77.18 81.03 85.09 89.34 
30.00 24.00 15.00 12.00 12.00 
-2.72 -7.12 -11.49 -17.67 -25.11 
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
0.00 -2.72 -7.12 -11.49 -17.67 -25.11 
-46.20 Ongoing Terminal Value 0.00 
-76.20 Liquidation Book Value 0.00 
191.74 
Exhibit 5 
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30 Local Content % O.OO%Tax Rate 45.00% 
0 Govt Loan% 0. OO$IntRate 6.00% 
80.00%Domes Mkt Gr 5.00%HurdleRat 9.00% 
0 Global Mkt Gr 2.OO%GovtHurdR 7.00% 
20 Wage/ProductivIncr% 5.00%TerminGrw 2.00% 
O.OO%YreToRenationalizat 50 XchngRate 1 
0.00% MILLION CEEROVIAN Cs 
0 1 2 3 4 5 
200.00 210.00 220.50 231.53 243.10 255.26 
10.00 10.20 10.40 10.61 10.82 11.04 
55.00% 49.50% 49.50% 49.50% 49.50% 49.50% 
70.00 73.50 77.18 81.03 85.09 89.34 
30.00 24.00 15.00 12.00 12.00 
31.70 34.63 38.25 40.75 42.74 
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
14.27 15.58 17.21 18.34 19.23 
0.00 17.44 19.05 21.04 22.41 23.51 
197.38 Ongoing Terminal Value 329.97 
167.38 Liquidation Book Value 0.00 
-98.27 
Exhibit 6 
Potential Joint Gains from Information Sharing 
Exhibit 7 
Potential Joint Gains from Negotiation 
Exhibit 8 
Initial Assessments of Risks for Each Party 
Exhibit 9 
Assessment of Risk after Information Sharing 
0 
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Exhibit 11 
Methods to Reduce Risk 
reduce business uncertainties 
- market research 
- marketing contracts 
perhaps with government purchase, as a way of paying off loan 
reduce legal risk 
- enforce contracts 
- stabilize payment of debt 
government assurances 
- eliminate tax uncertainty 
- guarantee line of credit 
- stabilize interest rates 
lessen financial leverage 
- debt for equity swaps: holders of government debt receive equity 
- supplier or customer provide the financing 
innovations in the privatization arrangement 
- give the buyer an option to purchase the company 
. at a fixed time 
. when fixed conditions are met 
- sell access to the domestic market instead of selling the enterprise 
- provide access to the domestic market for greenfield investment 
- lease-to-buy arrangement for assets of enterprise 
- facility swaps with other multinationals--reduction of vertical 
integration 
share the risk between government and buyer 
- government indemnify past environmental damage in exchange for 
some ownership 
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